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THESIS

**SOWING THE SEEDS OF SOFT POWER: THE UNITED
STATES AND INDIA IN THE NEXT GREAT GAME**

by

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December 2015

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IN THE NEXT GREAT GAME**

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ABSTRACT

In both the 2010 and 2015 *National Security Strategy*, the White House published President Barack Obama's remarks emphasizing that the United States must integrate all the tools of national power to further U.S. strategic interests. This is especially true in a dynamic and increasingly multipolar world. In what this thesis calls the Next Great Game, the future key players in this emerging geopolitical scenario are Iran, Russia, China, and India. This thesis focuses on India.

Using Joseph Nye's concept of hard power and soft power, this thesis explores what bonds can and do serve to align the United States and India. In doing so, this thesis makes it clear that the United States and India share several soft power bonds as a result of their respective historic connections to British colonialism, which to a certain degree has already set the conditions for the integration of all the tools of U.S. national power with India. Though historic disagreements and complex regional relations stymie the process, the United States must be cognizant of the type of relationship that is presenting itself and understand that the tools of government may be less important than the form of power being exercised.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CENTCOM	Central Command
DOD	Department of Defense
GWOT	Global War on Terror
INC	Indian National Congress
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
LeT	Laskar-e-Taiba
ML	Muslim League
MNNA	major non-NATO ally
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty
NSA	non-state actor
NSS	National Security Strategy
ORF	Observer Research Foundation
PACOM	Pacific Command
SOCPAC	Special Operations Command Pacific
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States
USD	U.S. dollars
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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I. THE FUTURE OF GEOPOLITICS

Currently, there seems to be a geopolitical power shift underway, a tectonic shift away from a world overshadowed by the United States and its Western allies and toward a multipolar world in which all the revised or emergent geopolitical actors reside in Eurasia. This shift away from the established powers of the West has been discussed and explored widely.¹ Though the game at hand is similar to the Nineteenth Century contest between the British Empire and Czarist Russia, known as the “Great Game,” this thesis uses the term the Next Great Game to describe the new multilateral contest and its key players (the latter is discussed later in this chapter) that is emerging with Eurasia as the primary focus or pivot. Though superficially similar to the “Great Game,” the Next Great Game will incorporate more key players and be much more complex. Therefore, if the United States wishes to play a role in Eurasia and beyond, it is vitally important to understand who the potential players in the Next Great Game are, what is its geographical extent, and what tools the United States has at its disposal to play the game.

A. THE NEXT GREAT GAME: EURASIA

The first step in exploring this issue is to examine the playing field in which the Next Great Game will be played. Alexander Cooley, author of *Great Games, Local Rules*, wrote in 2012 of a New Great Game, “a contest among the United States, Russia, and China for power and influence in Central Asia.”² Though his work is primarily focused on the actions of these nations from 2001 through 2011, it is useful for understanding where and why the future for international politics is shifting toward Eurasia. Another work written in 2010, Robert Kaplan’s *Monsoon*, also addresses this shift towards Eurasia, though Kaplan emphasizes that the future of United States’ power

¹ For example, see Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul M. Kennedy, *The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999); Mark T. Berger, and Heloise Weber, *Rethinking the Third World: International Development and World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

² Alexander Cooley, *Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3.

is tied to its influence, or lack thereof, on the lands that border on the Indian Ocean.³ Kaplan insists that global power is centered on the Indian Ocean, arguing that the ocean's position (bordering Asia, Africa, and the Middle East) makes it a global crossroad able to influence areas that are top U.S. strategic concerns. While Cooley is focused on Central Asia, and Kaplan on south Asia, John Mearsheimer's *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, written in 2001, shifts the focus to China and the nearby region. He describes an upcoming contest between a growing China and the United States as their competing interests will likely bring some amount of confrontation.⁴

To complicate the issue, other authors warn that the next conflict will be played out in the Middle East due to Iranian aspirations for regional dominance.⁵ For example, in 2007, Ali Ansari wrote *Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Great Crisis in the Middle East* in which he argues that the United States has long known that Iranian aspirations were counter to U.S. strategic interests. He notes that despite this situation, the United States has offered little more than rhetoric to counter Iranian goals. Aside from the ongoing nuclear talks between the United States and Iran and the role of Iran in combating Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which are important topics but outside the scope of this thesis, long-standing issues between Iran and the United States are now coming to a head. Ansari argues, "We have leapt from containment to confrontation, from apparent disinterest to an urgent need to do something. Iran is not simply a problem, it's *the* problem."⁶

While acknowledging the problem with Iran specifically and the Middle East generally, other authors argue that the United States ought to reallocate assets away from the Middle East specifically because it is a troubled area. While these issues can be

³ Robert Kaplan, *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power* (New York: Random House, 2010).

⁴ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, rev. ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 360–411.

⁵ See: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert M. Gates, and Suzanne Maloney, *Iran: Time for a New Approach* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004); Dore Gold, *The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies the West* (New York: Regnery Publisher 2009); Ali M. Ansari, *Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Great Crisis in the Middle East* (New York: Basic Books, 2007).

⁶ Ansari, *Confronting Iran*, 3.

largely attributed to the Global War on Terror (GWOT: a term that has since been dropped from the military lexicon), any further U.S. intervention in the region would likely only further deteriorate the situation. As Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson wrote in a 2015 *Foreign Affairs* article, “Washington needs to embrace the idea of establishing a healthier equilibrium in U.S.-Middle Eastern relations, one that involves a lighter management role for the United States.”⁷ They argue that any outcome that may come as a result of U.S. action will likely have unforeseen repercussions and be contorted against the best interests of the United States. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the United States to reallocate assets to an area that can have more positive results.

Therefore, from the books above (among many others), it would appear that while small-scale conflicts that fall within the parameters of the GWOT will continue to occur for the foreseeable future, the United States must also recognize that a great geopolitical contest is beginning to take shape in Eurasia. Moreover, it is that contest (the Next Great Game) in which the United States must make preparations now to ensure its long-term national interests. By looking at the previously described works, in the Next Great Game, it appears that the key players are shaping up to be Iran, Russia, China, and India. In this next section, this thesis briefly looks at these key players to determine where the United States not only could benefit but more so where a partnership is most likely.


B. THE NEXT GREAT GAME KEY PLAYERS: THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA

Of the key players in the Next Great Game, this thesis argues that India may or may not be the most beneficial partner, though there are certainly benefits, but it is the most likely. This is due to a converging of geopolitical interests (which will be briefly addressed), but also due to the ability of U.S. soft power to prove effective given the high positive perception of the United States, relative to other states as seen in Figure 1, and also within India, as seen in Figure 2. This perception stems from common British ties

⁷ Steven Simon and Johnathon Stevenson, “The End of Pax American: Why Washington’s Middle East Pullback Makes Sense,” *Foreign Affairs* (November–December 2015).

and the influence of Hollywood, both of which grants U.S. soft power a wealth of reserves within India.⁸ This topic is addressed further in the chapters to come.


Figure 1. Global Views of the United States



Source: Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter, "America's Global Image," Pew Global, June 23, 2015, accessed August 3, 2015, www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/23/1-america-global-image/.

⁸ Rini Bhattacharya Mehta, and Rajeshwari V. Pandharipande, *Bollywood and Globalization: Indian Popular Cinema, Nation, and Diaspora* (New York: Anthem Press, 2010).

Figure 2. Indian Global Perceptions



Source: Bruce Stokes, "How Indians See the World," Pew Global, September 17, 2015, accessed December 7, 2015, www.pewglobal.org/2015/09/17/the-modi-bounce/india-report-05/.

This is an obvious opportunity for the United States because if the nexus of the globe's cross roads lie within the nations along the Indian Ocean, as presented by Kaplan, along with the fact that, as noted by other observers, Iran, Russia, and the Peoples' Republic of China form a triangle of sorts to the north, then India's sheer size and geographic location provides it with the resources to be of considerable influence in the region. Furthermore, this dominance is amplified by India's growing influence in the region. India is the second most populous nation in the world with a population of roughly one billion people, second only to China, and has an active military of 1.32 million members, third behind China (first) and the U.S. (second).⁹ While fears persist of China's economic rise and projected 2030 date to surpass the U.S. economy, U.S. government reports project India will surpass the U.S. economy by around 2050.¹⁰ This dramatic rise has not gone unnoticed by U.S. policy makers.

⁹ James Hackett, *The Military Balance 2012: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics* (London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012).

¹⁰ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds* (NIC 2012-001), (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2012).

In 2010, President Barack Obama formally announced his intention to “Pivot to the Pacific” in the 2010 *National Security Strategy* (NSS). Essentially under this plan, President Obama wanted to draw down U.S. involvement in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility and increase U.S. influence into Pacific Command (PACOM).¹¹ However, while the idea was well intended, its application has been stunted largely due to continued crises in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Regarding Asia, primary concerns for the United States are the growing influence of China, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the growth/spread of religious extremism, all of which are shared concerns with India. The issues in region are exacerbated by the over-militarization and economic disproportion that plague the Indo-Asian Pacific.¹² The region contains seven of the top 10 largest active militaries, including three of the top four in the world, and also two of the three largest economies along with 10 of the 14 smallest.¹³ This disparity creates a scenario in which a rapidly emerging nation, such as China, can spread its influence in an attempt to upset the balance of power in the region. Also, states with weaker central governments, such as Indonesia, are finding themselves vulnerable to radical extremists who can use isolated areas for training and staging. These issues demand constant attention and frequent intervention, and often more than the United States can offer. Therefore, it would benefit the United States to have a trusted partner within the region who shares those same interests/concerns.

In 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued guidance saying, “The United States is also investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability

¹¹ CENTCOM is consists of 20 countries, including the recent hot spots of Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. For more information visit: www.centcom.mil. PACOM consists of 36 countries in the Asian-Pacific region. For more information visit: <http://www.pacom.mil/AboutUSPACOM/USPACOMAreaofResponsibility.aspx>.

¹² This term encompasses all the area from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. Landmasses include India in the west to the Korean Peninsula in the northeast. The difference between Indo-Asian Pacific and Asia is that the former includes Australia and New Zealand but excludes nations that do not have ocean access.

¹³ Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), accessed August 9, 2014, <http://www.socpac.socom.mil/default.aspx>; James Hackett, *The Military Balance 2012: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense Economics* (London: Routledge, 2012), 233–242.

to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.”¹⁴ In 2014, the *Quadrennial Defense Review* expanded this by stating, “The United States supports India’s rise as an increasingly capable actor in the region, and we are deepening our strategic partnership.”¹⁵ While these statements sound promising, the question this thesis asks is: How?

The first step in understanding how to improve current U.S.-Indo relations is to understand what obstacles have been carried over from the past. Over the past near 70 years, relations between India and the United States have been filled with icy patches that are only now warming up. To understand better why this is so, a brief look into the history of U.S.-Indo relations follows.

Freedom at Midnight, written by Collins and Lapierre in 1975, is one of the best works to describe the complexity and chaos surrounding Indian independence.¹⁶ Following the Indian Independence Act of 1947, fierce debate about how the new nation would be governed erupted within India’s interim government.¹⁷ Not only were political borders part of the debate, but everything from gold reserves to government office furniture needed to be divided as part of “the most complex divorce in history.”¹⁸

Following its independence, India immediately fell into a complex five-way geopolitical relationship as described in Richard Siegel’s *Evaluating the Results of Foreign Policy*, written in 1969. Key influencers included: the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), China, and of course Pakistan. During the first few decades of India’s existence, nearly all geopolitical relations had to take into

¹⁴ Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 2.

¹⁵ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014), 17.

¹⁶ Dominique Lapierre, and Larry Collins, *Freedom at Midnight* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 205–236.

¹⁸ Lapierre, and Collins, *Freedom at Midnight*, 212.

consideration these five interested parties.¹⁹ The work *India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers*, by William Barnds in 1972, examines the relationships between the new nations of India and Pakistan and their relations to the great powers of the day. In this work, we see the divide between India and the United States start after the United States sided with Pakistan over the first Kashmir conflict of 1947, a divide which continued to grow throughout the Cold War.²⁰

Helping to grow the divide between the U.S. and India was Soviet interaction with India. In *Soviet Policy towards India*, by J. A. Naik in 1960, the author explains how the Soviets enticed India to align with the USSR during the Cold war.²¹ In this work, Naik explains that the Soviets fared much better and were able to influence India's policy makers because the Soviet Union enjoyed a far better image in India than the United States. The Soviets were keen to capitalize on this perception to negotiate favorable treaties and agreements. The first Indo-Soviet agreement was signed on December 2, 1953, and the most important facet of this agreement was not the goods traded but rather the terms. Traditional stipulations placed on India by Western nations were removed by the Soviets. These Western stipulations usually included that trade must be conducted in Western currency and that India's imports must exceed its exports.²² The lifting of these handicaps sent a strong message to India that the Soviet Union saw India as a legitimate regional actor, rather than a lesser state. The message was well received and served to draw India closer to the Soviet Union. This is evidenced by the dramatic increase in trade between India and the Soviet Union during this period. Under Stalin, the Soviet Union represented less than one percent of all Indian exports, but that number had increased to

¹⁹ Richard L. Siegel, *Evaluating the Results of Foreign Policy: Soviet and American Efforts in India*, The Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies Monograph Series in World Affairs, 6 (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1969).

²⁰ William Barnds, *India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 257–348.

²¹ J. A. Naik, *Soviet Policy towards India: From Stalin to Brezhnev* (Delhi: Vikas Publication, 1970).

²² *Ibid.*, 163–168.

16 percent by 1965, making the Soviet Union the third most popular destination for Indian exports.²³

The 1960s and 1970s saw more conflict in the region, with armed conflicts involving India, Pakistan, China, and the formation of Bangladesh from East Pakistan. During the Pakistani civil war in 1971, in which the Indians were actively supporting East Pakistan, the United States sailed into the Bay of Bengal with a carrier led strike group. While the United States was seeking to quell the growing crisis, the Indians perceived this act as support for Pakistan in a form of Western gunboat diplomacy.²⁴ As a result, as described in Douglas Borer's 1999 work, *Superpowers Defeated*, both Afghanistan and India drew closer to the Soviet Union.²⁵ In this book, it describes how the United States decided to strengthen its partnership with Pakistan after the newly formed communist regime in Afghanistan sought the help of the Soviet Union in 1979. Now, Pakistan was shaping up to be a key strategic ally against the Soviets in the Cold War. For the United States, the decision to provide military and economic aid to Pakistan was seen as vital to continue support to the mujahedeen in Afghanistan.²⁶ However, this cooperation would further erode U.S. relations with India.

Though India proclaimed to be “non-aligned” nation, it clearly leaned towards the Soviet Union during this period. These sentiments were reinforced when the United States openly condemned India for acquiring nuclear weapons, which India first successfully tested in 1974. This icy period is perhaps best described in a 1992 work by Dennis Kux titled, *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies*.²⁷ Backed by the belief that the Soviet Union supported its actions, India was moving from a non-aligned

²³ Naik, *Soviet Policy towards India*, 134.

²⁴ P. R. Chari, “Indo-US Relations: Non-proliferation Concerns,” in *Engaging India: U.S. Strategic Relations with the World's Largest Democracy*, ed. Gary K. Bertsch, Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam Srivastava (London: Routledge, 1999), 3.

²⁵ Douglas A. Borer, *Superpowers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999).

²⁶ Borer, *Superpowers Defeated*, 181–182.

²⁷ Dennis Kux, *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941–1991* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1992).

to a pro-Soviet status in the international arena. However, once the Soviet Union fell in the late 1980s, India would feel isolated, having felt the sting of losing a key backer while remaining surrounded by regional threats.

Engaging India is a leading work by Gary Bertsch from 1999 that examines the tense relations between the United States and India following the Cold War.²⁸ A key area of tension, as also identified in 2009 by Dinshaw Mistry's *Complexity of Deterrence among New Nuclear States*, were concerns over the proliferation of nuclear weapons and subsequent sanctions placed by the United States objecting to India's nuclear testing during another clash with Pakistan over Kashmir in 1998.²⁹ These sanctions would largely stay in place until 2008 and would play a significant role in the poor economic growth of India in the 1980s and 1990s. Relations between India and the United States would be further stressed when U.S. intervention in Afghanistan as part of the GWOT would necessitate closer cooperation between the United States and Pakistan as explained in Usama Butt and Julian Scholfield's 2012 work, *Pakistan: The U.S., Geopolitics and Grand Strategies*.³⁰

From this brief look at history, it can be seen that the U.S.-Pak relationship has been instrumental to secure U.S. strategic objectives in the region and beyond. Recently, however, the United States and India have been drawn closer over shared interests, including concerns over growing Chinese influence within the region, and increased trade opportunities with each other; however, ongoing U.S. relations with Pakistan continue to complicate the diplomatic progress. Though this budding U.S.-Indo relationship does not need to come at the expense of the U.S.-Pak partnership, as the U.S.-Pak and U.S.-Indo relationships do not have to be a zero-sum game, as some U.S. policy makers may have

²⁸ Gary Bertsch, Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam Srivastava, *Engaging India: US Strategic Relations with the World's Largest Democracy* (New York: Routledge, 1999).

²⁹ Dinshaw Mistry, "Complexity of Deterrence among New Nuclear States," in *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age*, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

³⁰ Usama Butt, and Julian Scholfield, *Pakistan: The U.S., Geopolitics and Grand Strategies* (London: Pluto Press, 2012).

and may still believe.³¹ What it may take is a different approach. Though Pakistan has been critical to facilitate U.S. hard power and force projection, there are other forms of national power than can be useful to form alliances and align nations. The following section examines these methods in more detail.

C. THE TOOLS AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE NEXT GREAT GAME

A leading realist author, Mearsheimer, presents his idea of “offensive realism” in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. According to realists, great powers, like Russia and China, are always looking for an opportunity to increase their power, especially relative to that of their rivals. By using “offensive realism,” the United States can seek out opportunities to use “calculated aggression” to prevent another great power from assuming enough power to gain an advantage over the United States. By using such methods as balancing and bandwagoning, the United States can form alliances with other great and lesser powers to challenge a rising power.³² For instance, Mearsheimer suggests that a bandwagon with the United States could be used by India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, or Vietnam to contain Chinese power.³³ While these nations may not necessarily want to support the United States, it may still prove useful to them to be on the winning side of a confrontation with a great power. This theory is useful to form alliances, but given the sensitive relationship between India, Pakistan, and China, it may raise concerns. If the United States were to join an Indian bandwagon against one of the other nations stated, it would drastically shift the balance of power and possibly cause what Mearsheimer calls a “security competition.”³⁴ This is where one nation perceives another nation’s change in security posture as a threat and then

³¹ P. R. Chari, “Indo-US Relations: Non-proliferation Concerns,” in *Engaging India: U.S. Strategic Relations with the World’s Largest Democracy*, ed. Gary K. Bertsch, Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam Srivastava (London: Routledge, 1999), 3.

³² For definitions and explanation of balancing and bandwagoning, see Mearshimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 139.

³³ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 361–362.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 362.

subsequently increases its security measures. This in turn can be seen as a threat to other nations, who respond likewise, and the problem escalates.

Another theory, proposed by authors such as Alexander Wendt, speaks about constructivism and a social theory of international politics.³⁵ According to constructivists, the structure of the international system is created by shared ideas, as much as or even more than by material goods. In this theory, social constructs are the key to creating connections. Contrary to realism, the drive for power and material goods is primarily the manifestation of social desires. Where nations share the same social desires, their interests will align. This concept is much better suited for the Next Great Game. Given the precarious nature of the relationships involved, the aligning of ideas can be useful to form partnerships without overtly endangering another state. The importance and relevance of these two theories (realism and constructivism) need to be remembered as we turn to a discussion of “soft power” propounded by Joseph Nye.

According to Joseph Nye, former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Clinton administration, power can be explored by focusing on two primary components: soft power and hard power. Soft power, as famously defined by Nye in his 1990 work *Bound to Lead*, is a national tool used to attract and persuade nation states to voluntarily align with another state.³⁶ Therefore, soft power can be viewed as similar to the constructivist’s idea that geopolitical bonds are created by shared social constructs. Conversely, hard power, consisting of military and economic might, can be best described as the geopolitical equivalent of the “carrot and stick” approach and reflects the realists’ view of power. However, according to Nye, both hard power and soft power are useful to complement the other, forming “smart power,” as described in his 2004 work *Soft Power*.

³⁵ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

³⁶ Joseph Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990). For other works by Nye about soft power see: *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004); *The Powers to Lead* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); *The Future of Power*. (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

To apply this theory to policy, let us examine the 2010 *National Security Strategy* (NSS) where President Barack Obama stressed the need to “integrate all of the tools of American power.”³⁷ This was reinforced in the 2015 NSS, in which the president said, “We will lead with all the instruments of US power.”³⁸ Following these remarks from the president, respectively, both the 2010 and 2015 NSS go on to identify numerous tools and instruments used to manipulate power. While these tools and instruments seemed to differ greatly, according to Nye, all these varying tools are being used to wield two basic forms of national power: hard power and soft power.³⁹ This is important when attempting to integrate the tools, as it is more important to focus on the form of power being exercised rather than the tool. Of the two forms of power needed to generate smart power, arguably the most underestimated, or perhaps the most misunderstood, is soft power.⁴⁰ This is incredibly useful to understand when exploring potential strategic partnerships in the Next Great Game.

For example, a U.S. relationship with Pakistan is vital to secure U.S. long-term interests and facilitate security within the region. For this reason, the United States cannot simply turn away from Pakistan in favor for India, as a zero-sum methodology would suggest. Instead, the United States can continue a hard power focused relationship with Pakistan while still improving relations with India through with a soft power centric approach. An example of U.S. soft power at work can be seen in the 2010 work by Mehta and Pandharipande, *Bollywood and Globalization*. In this book the authors explain how the influence of Hollywood was profound and proved essential in the creation of the Indian film industry known as Bollywood.⁴¹ This also created a market for U.S. goods as India had been viewing American movies for years, but the population was largely unable

³⁷ White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf, 14.

³⁸ White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: White House, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf, 4.

³⁹ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 31.

⁴⁰ This argument will be addressed later in the chapter, in the section titled “Tools Available to the United States in the Next Great Game.”

⁴¹ Mehta, and Pandharipande, *Bollywood and Globalization*.

to attain the goods they saw on the screen until after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The effect of Hollywood created a fertile market for American made goods and as explained in *Engaging India*, Bertsch describes how the first interaction India had with the West after the fall was through American made goods and merchandise.⁴² As Indian markets opened to the United States, trade between the nations skyrocketed. As a result, U.S.-Indo trade dramatically rose from about \$4.5 billion in 1988 to near \$27 billion in 2005.⁴³ Just as Soviet soft power had increased trade with India in the 1960s, U.S. soft power has now granted the United States access to avenues to improve U.S.-Indo relations. This idea is developed further in the chapters to come.

While small-scale conflicts from the GWOT and post-GWOT era are sure to entangle U.S. hard power assets for the foreseeable future, it is imperative for the United States to remain engaged and shape the Next Great Game. To these ends, soft power provides a means for the United States to still continue to improve relations with a strong regional actor, like India. Furthermore, soft power is precisely the right application of U.S. national power given the geopolitical situation that is currently between the neighboring states in Eurasia. However, while this chapter has briefly addressed how U.S. soft power can improve relations with India, it has not addressed why U.S. soft power can work. With this concept at its focus, this thesis uncovers what are fundamental elements for the current soft power bonds that are between India and the United States. To do this, this thesis first explores what soft power is and what are the conditions that favor its cultivation. Next, this thesis uncovers some of the common bonds between India and the United States that have contributed to the favorable cultivation of U.S. soft power. Lastly, this thesis concludes with final thoughts and recommendations.

⁴² Gary Bertsch, Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam Srivastava, *Engaging India: U.S. Strategic Relations with the World's Largest Democracy*. (New York: Routledge, 1999).

⁴³ S. Paul Kapur, and Sumit Ganguly. "The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations," *Asian Survey*, 47, no. 4 (2007): 649, accessed October 27, 2015, http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Kapur_Transformation_of_U.S._India_Relations.pdf.

II. U.S. SOFT POWER AND THE NEXT GREAT GAME

A farmer went out to plant some seeds. As he scattered them across his field, some seeds fell on a footpath, and the birds came and ate them. Other seeds fell on shallow soil with underlying rock. The seeds sprouted quickly because the soil was shallow. But the plants soon wilted under the hot sun, and since they didn't have deep roots, they died. Other seeds fell among thorns that grew up and choked out the tender plants. Still other seeds fell on fertile soil, and they produced a crop that was thirty, sixty, and even a hundred times as much as had been planted!⁴⁴

As discussed in Chapter I, the Next Great Game is quickly taking shape. If the United States wishes to be a key player in the game, it must start now to use every means at its disposal to shape the playing field. In doing so, the United States must identify the key players and, more importantly, identify like-minded regional powerbrokers.

The above parable provides a good analogy for soft power. In both cases, the seeds and soft power can be spread widely but will only thrive in an environment that is both receptive and conducive as far as actual results are concerned. In contrast, U.S. hard power resources are finite and must be allocated precisely. For the United States, it is thus beneficial to understand when and where the conditions are conducive to soft power to better know when and where to align other national assets to maximize on all the elements of power and influence an intended outcome. To do this, this chapter briefly discusses the different applications of soft power, hard power, and what Nye terms smart power, focusing on the composition of soft and hard power.⁴⁵ Next, this chapter explores how to identify a receptive audience for the United States' soft power and provides ways to identify when U.S. soft power is proving effective.

⁴⁴ Matthew 13: 3-8.

⁴⁵ Joseph Nye, "Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power," *Foreign Affairs* (July–August 2009), accessed Oct. 27, 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-07-01/get-smart>. See also: Joseph Nye, *The Future of Power*, Chapter 7 "Smart Power."

A. SOFT POWER, HARD POWER, AND SMART POWER

While soft power and hard power are both needed to complement the other—forming smart power—how each is employed is drastically different. Hard power is rather universal in its application and understanding. While the threat of force may be received differently by various nation states, there is an understanding that certain decisions taken at their end could lead to a deadly military response by the geopolitical actor concerned. Similarly, economic sanctions to deter or punish a rogue nation can be put in place, and while they may not lead to deadly consequences, these sanctions are intended to cause some hardship. Both these measures are calculated efforts to cause “pain” with the anticipated goal of imposing one nation’s will over another; however, soft power is more free-floating and more difficult to quantify. It takes a certain sense of geopolitical nuance to know when it is working and how to apply it. Soft power is not an instrument that can be wielded or brought to bear against an adversary; however, it can be cultivated and capitalized upon by a savvy actor to amplify other national power instruments. Therefore, if the key to smart power is the proper application of hard power and soft power in concert, then knowing where soft power exists provides a possible venue for hard power to be used in a complementary fashion. This is an important first step in integrating all the tools of U.S. power as addressed in the NSSes mentioned in the preceding chapter.

Nye explains that the key to applying soft power is its ability to attract other nations. In addition, he goes on to explain that the United States, as a powerful nation, has considerable soft power reserves because other nations want to be like the United States or at least be as powerful. The National Intelligence Council’s *Global Trends 2030* goes further, saying, “The economics of globalization have spread the West’s ideas of scientific reason, individualism, secular government, and primacy of law to societies seeking the West’s material progress.”⁴⁶ Along with attraction, it therefore also becomes in other nations’ best interests to emulate and/or align with the United States in order to be successful. This is similar to the concept of “bandwagoning,” mentioned earlier. The

⁴⁶ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends*, 13.

main point here is that, alongside hard power considerations, the United States can take this concept and apply it using soft power. In the case for soft power bandwagoning, other nations will seek to emulate the United States to attract increased cooperation, believing that aligning with the United States will reap greater benefits as compared to bandwagoning with another power. For instance, if a nation wishes to conduct more trade with the United States, that nation could adopt some ideals that the United States would look upon favorably, such as implementing some type of internal change to appear more attractive to the United States.

An example of this would be the actions of Mikhail Gorbachev in enacting Perestroika (restructuring), Glasnost (openness), Demokratizatsiya (democratization), and Uskoreniye (acceleration). These Soviet domestic actions were caused by a desire to keep pace with Western economies, as well as an attempt to address various other domestic issues. Gorbachev knew the Soviet system was failing, and he could also see that the United States was growing in wealth and power. Therefore, Gorbachev sought to reform more than just an economic system. Gorbachev was trying to enact such Western ideas as increased human rights, freedom of speech, and freedom of information to induce systematic changes in an effort to mimic Western success, while also attempting to make the Soviet Union more appealing for Western nations to work with.⁴⁷ This simple example illustrates that the sources of attraction can come from many sources, and in this way, it is impossible to unravel hard power and soft power from smart power. Though, the fact the act is voluntary is crucial when considering the Next Great Game, as any overt external pressure from the United States will likely be rebuffed by other strong regional actors. By applying U.S. national power in a soft-power centric approach in the Next Great Game, the risk and cost is much lower than an overt hard power presence, but the reward, as seen in the Gorbachev example, can be high.

It is important to understand the role that soft power can play, as the use of hard power alone can also have unintended repercussions. For example, Nye was very vocal

⁴⁷ Pierre Hassner, "Gorbachev and the West," *Washington Quarterly* 11, no. 4 (1988): 95–103, DOI 10.1080/0163660880947750.

against the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. According to Nye, U.S. leaders did not consider the use of soft power or the implications that hard power acts can have on soft power resources. Aside from disregarding soft power as useful in helping to form a coalition, Nye argues that the unilateral application of hard power diminished American's international appeal and significantly eroded its ability to use soft power in the future.⁴⁸ Furthermore, by ignoring soft power, the United States' actions in Iraq can be seen as failing to understand what Nye describes as a "complex three-dimensional chess game."⁴⁹ The top level (composed of political-military issues) and the middle board (consisting of economic power) are very much hard power concerns; however, the bottom board (involving transnational relations) is in constant flux, and hard power alone is often inadequate and/or inappropriate. The bottom board requires soft power because the issues that are played at that level require multilateral solutions.⁵⁰ In this comparison, the United States may have won on one or two levels, but it failed to consider all the levels of power and ultimately lost in what Nye called, "a profound misunderstanding of the nature of power in world politics."⁵¹

Prior to what Nye refers to as the information age, an age beginning roughly at the dawn of the Twenty-first Century, there are instances where hard power alone has been used successfully.⁵² One such application would be the formation of an alliance to achieve a focused military objective, such as the Allies in World War II. In this case, although the Allies did form a successful alliance to defeat the Axis Powers, they did not always have a foundation with each other that was reinforced by soft power. However, it is important to note that on the micro scale, soft power played a notable role in the

⁴⁸ Joseph Nye, "The Decline of America's Soft Power," *Foreign Affairs* (May–June 2004), accessed October 27, 2015, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59888/joseph-s-nye-jr/the-decline-of-americas-soft-power>.

⁴⁹ Nye, *Soft Power*, 136.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 136–137.

⁵¹ "Joseph Nye on Soft Power after Iraq," *Atlantic Community*, accessed October 27, 2015, http://www.atlantic-community.org/index.php/Global_Must_Read_Article/Joseph_Nye_on_Soft_Power_After_Iraq.

⁵² Nye, *Soft Power*, 30–32, 134. Referring to a RAND publication by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt.

mobilization of the public within each nation, but on the macro level, the soft power bonds between the United States and the Soviet Union were sparse.⁵³ This made the U.S. partnership with the Soviet Union fleeting. The reason the Allies fell apart, or more accurately why the Soviet Union withdrew from the alliance, is because that alliance—or any alliance based on strictly hard power concerns—was based on the military situation at the time. In an alliance based strictly on hard power considerations, once the situation changes, it is difficult to foresee if the partnership will remain in place. In this case, once Nazi Germany was eliminated, the differing geopolitical agendas and the superficiality of the socially constructed wartime views of the United States and the Soviet Union quickly tore the alliance apart.

From the start, President Roosevelt disliked the authoritarian Soviet regime and did not trust its motives. He even placed what he called a “moral embargo” on certain items exported to the Soviet Union as part of the lend-lease program. Though President Roosevelt understood that Nazi Germany was the greater enemy at the time, the president compared the alliance with the Soviet Union to “hold[ing] hands with the devil.”⁵⁴ As Frank Capra, the leading director of American propaganda films during World War II later said in an interview, “We had a political problem with Russia ... The problem was that a hell of a lot of people on our side were not about to be sold a bill of goods by the Communists. We were their allies, but that was all.”⁵⁵ Both Roosevelt and Capra knew that the American people were not going to and, in fact, did not have to like the Soviets to form an effective military alliance. The same was also true from the Soviets’ perspective, as they saw the United States as corrupted by capitalistic greed and considered U.S. foreign involvement to be a form of economic imperialism.⁵⁶ Therefore, the uneasy alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States was a means to an end, and once

⁵³ R.J. Overy, *Why the Allies Won* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996).

⁵⁴ “US-Soviet Alliance, 1941–1945,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed October 27, 2015, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/us-soviet>.

⁵⁵ Leland Poague, ed., *Frank Capra Interviews* (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2004), 125.

⁵⁶ Jackson Spielvogel, *Western Civilization: Volume II: Since 1500* (Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning, 2009), 862–864.

that end was achieved, the relationship could not last. However, even this style of alliance is increasingly difficult to create in the information age without the bonds of soft power. Outside the purpose of this thesis, but nonetheless important to consider, would be any possible correlation between this alliance and the current alliance forming to fight the Islamic State.

The World War II alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union was thus based on hard power alone because neither country was amenable to or attracted to the other's soft power. For soft power to be effective, the host nation must be receptive. Compare the relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States to that with Great Britain and the United States following World War II. The United States and Britain formed a meaningful alliance based on both their alignment at the geopolitical level and similar (relatively speaking) social and cultural views. These bonds held together even after the fall of Nazi Germany and became the foundation for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which ironically stood in direct opposition to the Soviet Union following the war. In this way, it can be seen that the bonds created by soft power helped build the Anglo-American "special relationship," a relationship that has an ability be transposed onto various situations. The special U.S.-British relationship remains more or less in place to this day. It is important to keep this in mind when discussing a possible U.S. partnership with India explored in the chapters to come.


B. FINDING A RECEPTIVE AUDIENCE

When seeking to identify a receptive audience, it is important to consider that certain civilizations may present themselves inherently more receptive to U.S. soft power. For this purpose, useful works are Samuel Huntington's *Foreign Affairs* article, "The Clash of Civilizations" and book of the same name.⁵⁷ In these works, Huntington writes that the world is broken into several civilizations, as depicted in Figure 3.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs* (summer 1993); *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone 1997).

⁵⁸ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone 1997), 40–55.

Figure 3. Major Civilizations According to Huntington




Source: *Wikipedia*, s.v., “Clash of Civilizations,” accessed October 26, 2015, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clash_of_Civilizations#cite_note-8. Original image can be found in Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone 1997), 26–27.

By exploring Huntington’s work, the purpose is not to argue for or against his findings but rather to explore the analysis he conducted as it pertains to identifying the boundaries of different civilizations and the general trends that can be inferred from these boundaries.

When considering the key players in the Next Great Game, we can see that in the background four separate civilizations are vying for regional dominance. This is a key consideration when exploring where soft power can prove effective, as each civilization views the United States through a unique lens. This is useful when analyzing a recent Pew Research poll of global perception of the United States, as depicted on the map in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Global Opinion of the United States



Source: Max Fisher, "Who Loves and Hates America: A Revealing Map of Global Opinion toward the U.S.," *Washington Post*, January 11, 2013, accessed August 3, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/01/11/who-loves-and-hates-america-a-revealing-map-of-global-opinion-toward-the-u-s/>.

Of the four key nations in consideration, the researchers in a 2015 Pew Research Poll asked the citizens of these countries whether they had a favorable, unfavorable, or neutral perception of the United States. The results are shown as an average of the responses given by the population within the stated nation:


- Iran: no information available.
- Russia: 15 percent favorable, 81 percent unfavorable; a net of 66 percentage points unfavorable.
- India: 70 percent favorable, eight percent unfavorable; a net of 62 percentage points favorable.
- China: 44 percent favorable, 49 percent unfavorable; a net of 5 percentage points unfavorable.⁵⁹

The results are telling. If attraction is the key to soft power, as laid out by Nye, then the greater the positive perception of the United States is, the greater the probability

⁵⁹ Pew Research Center, "Global Indicators Database," last modified in spring 2105, accessed August 5, 2015, <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/survey/17/response/Unfavorable/map/>.

of attraction. The results of this poll are even more telling when overlaid onto Huntington's civilizations map, focusing on the four key nations of the Next Great Game, as seen in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Global Opinion of the United States along Civilizational Lines



This map was created by the author by overlaying Huntington's map, and the results of the Pew Research Poll map. Adapted from Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone 1997); Pew Research Center, "Global Indicators Database," last modified in Spring 2105, accessed August 5, 2015, <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/survey/17/response/Unfavorable/map/>.

This is useful as it appears that to a greater or lesser degree, the overall perception of the United States and therefore the expected effectiveness of its soft power, seemingly falls along civilizational lines. Not surprisingly, the strongest positive perception is found among Western nations; however, a closer examination of the four key nations of the Next Great Game reveals much. Of the four states that most negatively view the United States, all of them are within the Islamic civilization, which includes Iran and Pakistan. Perception is only slightly better in the Sinic civilization (China), and Orthodox (Russia) is just a few percentage points higher but is still a net negative. Last, but not least, the

Hindu civilization (consisting only of India) exhibits a highly positive perception of the United States.

This information is useful, not only for finding out where there is a significant positive perception of the United States, but also where there are “swing civilizations.” As previously discussed, Huntington divided the globe into two main categories: “the West,” and, “the Rest.”⁶⁰ However, there were a few exceptions that Huntington identified as being able to go to either way. India is one of those swing civilizations.⁶¹ This is important to consider not only because of India’s current/future role in geopolitics, as discussed in the previous chapter, but also because of the high potential for soft power to continue to be and increase being embraced by India. Much of this attraction has to do with numerous commonalities between India and the United States. These commonalities, if properly understood, can provide a firm foundation for a meaningful partnership and are the focus of the next chapter.

⁶⁰ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 56–78.

⁶¹ Ibid.

III. THE SEEDS OF A U.S. SOFT POWER APPROACH TO INDIA

When exploring where U.S. soft power may prove effective, a good starting point is finding a receptive audience based on a positive perception of the United States, as discussed in the previous chapter. This has helped to identify India (with a 70 percent favorable perception of the United States) as a likely recipient of U.S. soft power among the powerbrokers in the Next Great Game. However, further analysis using Nye's attributes of soft power (domestic values, culture, and foreign policy) uncovers much more. The purpose of this chapter is to explore what commonalities there are between the United States and India that serve to form soft power bonds based on these attributes. To do this, the first part of the chapter explores the role that a common British ancestry played in shaping the domestic values that India and the United States share today. Next, this chapter explores shared cultural attributes between the United States and India by examining the influence of the American film industry. In addition, this chapter uncovers some common soft power themes that lay in both U.S. and Indian foreign policy. It is the purpose of this chapter to show that many common values are shared by both the United States and India and that these shared attributes provide significant soft power reserves.

A. INDIAN DOMESTIC VALUES: A LEGACY OF THE BRITISH

When exploring what commonalities may exist between the United States and India, it is useful to explore the respective histories of each nation. When doing so, the dominant shared experience is that both the United States and India were once colonies under the British Crown. In this next section, this thesis will briefly review Indian history as a British colony, and in doing so, uncovers several soft power seeds that currently serve to create soft power bonds between India and the United States.

1. Common Language

Western influence on the subcontinent can be traced back to the British and the East India Company in the 1600s.⁶² Though technically a private company, the East Indian Company was under a royal charter, and as a result, the British monarchy exercised indirect control over the company. At the time, the British were in fierce competition in both south and east Asia with other European powers seeking to expand their respective influence along the Silk Road. Interests clashed in 1757 during the Battle of Plassey, in which the privately operated English East India Army won a decisive battle against the Mughals and their French allies. As a result of the battle, the English East India Company assumed all administrative functions over more and more territory over the next century until 1857, when a major revolt necessitated the intervention of the British Army. After extinguishing what was called the Sepoy Rebellion (or the Great Mutiny) in 1858, the British Crown used the intervention to replace the English East India Company with the British Raj. India was now under direct rule of the British Crown, with Queen Victoria taking the title of the Empress of India.⁶³

A quick analysis of British rule of India gives some indication as to why India is or can be receptive to U.S. soft power today. By assuming full administrative control over India in 1858, the British made English the language of government in the Indian Empire. While English is not as widely used in India as it is in the United States today, it remains the official language of both governments (even though Indian English and American English are different in various ways). Having a shared language helps to ensure that certain nuances and connotations are not quite literally lost in translation and is useful to ease the spread of such American cultural influencers as music or movies. The importance of a shared language in creating a receptive audience for American music and film is noteworthy and will be addressed again later in this chapter.

⁶² Romila Thapar, and Thomas George Percival Spear, *A History of India* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965).

⁶³ Thapar and Spear, *A History of India*.

2. Concerns over Taxes and Representation

After the World War I, the British increased their taxation on the Indian people to help offset the cost of the war. This served to increase Indian resentment and fomented several protests, such as those that led to the Amritsar massacre in 1919.⁶⁴ British attempts to quell the unrest through violence only caused more agitation. Eventually, the British relented and agreed to some of the Indian demands through the passing of the Government of India Act in 1935. This act, passed by the British Parliament, introduced limited political autonomy to the Indian Empire.⁶⁵

Several similarities can be drawn from this quick snapshot in time. Both the Indian Empire and the colonies that formed the United States faced many of the same issues while under the Crown. Both native populations rejected the imposition of taxes and other administrative duties by what was being increasingly seen as a foreign occupying force. The reaction of the British to attempt to squash any rebellion with violence, whether in Boston in 1770 or in the Punjab in 1919, only served to create more resistance and foment future unrest.

3. The Role of Law

A notable similarity, created by the passing of the Government of India Act in 1935, was that India adopted an English style of law. The act divorced the Indian judicial system from the duty of the British governors and shifted more responsibility onto provincial governments headed by Indians.⁶⁶ This resulted in India developing a judicial system based on an English common law system, as in the United States. As seen in Figure 6, only nations that were once under the governance of the British Crown can claim this heritage. This is useful because both the United States and India share an understanding about the role and implementation of the law, not to be confused with the rule of law which is addressed later.

⁶⁴ David Omissi. "India and the Western Front," *BBC*, last modified March 3, 2011, accessed October 27, 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/india_wwone_01.shtml.

⁶⁵ Michael Edwardes, *The Last Years of British India* (London: Cassell, 1963).

⁶⁶ Edwardes, *The Last Years of British India*.

Figure 6. Law Systems around the Globe



Source: “World Map,” University of Ottawa, accessed May 4, 2015, <http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/rep-geo/cartes/monde.php>.

In addition to leaving behind a case-law system, the British also instilled the concept of the rule of law that inspired first the United States and then India to seek social equality under the law.⁶⁷ This idea was so powerful that once India was granted independence, Indian lawmakers tried with uneven results to eliminate its ancient caste system. In 1947, the Indian constitution put forth article 16, which required “equality of opportunity in matters of public employment,” while article 17, enacted the “abolition of untouchability,” made it illegal to discriminate based on said caste.⁶⁸ In practice untouchability and the caste system still operates on a day-to-day basis, although they have certainly been weakened. Since then, numerous laws, such as India’s reservation policy, have attempted to assist lower caste Indians. Under the reservation policy, a quota

⁶⁷ Bernard Schwartz, *The Great Rights of Mankind: A History of the American Bill of Rights* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002).

⁶⁸ “The Constitution of India,” accessed October 27, 2015, [http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/Const.Pock%20Pg.Rom8Fsss\(6\).pdf](http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/Const.Pock%20Pg.Rom8Fsss(6).pdf).

system for public jobs was put in place mandating that a certain percentage of jobs go to those from historically lower castes. This process has been compared to affirmative action laws within the United States.⁶⁹

4. Type of Government

While the passing of the Government of India Act in 1935 was intended to ease tensions between the British and the native population, it actually increased hostility among a diverse and divided native population. This was especially true for the minority Muslim population as they were very fearful of Hindu domination in domestic issues. As a result, two major political parties formed with each attempting to consolidate authority. The largest party was the Indian National Congress (INC), representing most of the Indian Hindu population. The second largest was the Muslim League (ML), which represented states with predominantly Muslim populations. Mistrust between the two parties was evident from the start, as evidenced in 1940 when the leader of the ML said, “Muslims and Hindus ... were irreconcilably opposed monolithic religious communities and as such no settlement could be imposed.”⁷⁰ Leaders within the INC, such as Mahatma Gandhi, urged the Indian Empire to stay intact until a peaceful resolution could be reached. In 1940, during an all India Congress Committee meeting in Bombay, Gandhi took the opportunity to voice his concerns, “It is worse than anarchy to partition a poor country like India whose every corner is populated by Hindus and Muslims living side by side. It is like cutting up a living body into pieces. No one will be able to tolerate this plain murder.”⁷¹

Following World War II, Indian nationalism was at an all-time high, and the British will to continue their occupation of India was at an all-time low. Movements led by leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi were gaining momentum. Gandhi’s call for Britain

⁶⁹ Thomas Weisskopf, *Affirmative Action in the United States and India: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

⁷⁰ Ian Talbot, and Gurharpal Singh, *The Partition of India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 33.

⁷¹ Bharati Mazmudar *Gandhi on Partition* (Mumbai: Mani Bhavan Gandhi Sangrahalaya, 2002), accessed June 15, 2015, <http://www.gandhi-manibhavan.org/gandhicomelive/ebks/gandhionpartition.pdf>.

to “quit India” became the rallying cry of the INC. This sentiment was punctuated with mutinies within the Royal Indian Navy and British Indian Army. These mutinies served to not only demonstrate a strong desire for Indian autonomy, but they also required British regulars to suppress. These issues were compounded for the British by numerous incidents of growing violence between the Muslim and Hindu populations, which also required British military assets to restore order.⁷² In turn, this would force more British troops to remain engaged in India well after the conclusion of World War II. Members of the British public would soon grow tired of having their servicemen overseas, and as violence in India escalated, so did the fervency of the public’s call for the return of their servicemen.⁷³ The British, exhausted by World War II, decided in 1946 that they would formally and quickly end British control in India by 1947.⁷⁴

A noteworthy soft power theme from this period is that both the United States and India underwent a social equality awakening, as previously described, which led to a revolution against British control and to ultimately establish a democratic government. Both the United States and India established their governments as democracies once given independence, with the latter gaining much inspiration from the U.S. Constitution.⁷⁵ This is important when considering the theory of the democratic peace, which surmises that, generally, democracies do not fight each other since they have more in common than whatever momentary differences they may have in relation to a specific issue.⁷⁶ Therefore, according to this logic, democracies find it more beneficial to cooperate and are more likely to try and work out their differences peacefully. This theory is debated, and while it is outside the purpose of this thesis to make a claim in this

⁷² Edwardes, *The Last Years of British India*.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Albert J. Rosenthal, and Louis Henkin, *Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of the United States Constitution Abroad* (Columbia University Press: New York. 1990), 94–101.

⁷⁶ Democratic peace theory has been attributed to originate from Immanuel Kant’s *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795). The concept was further developed by Dean Babst in the *Wisconsin Sociologist* in 1964; he conducted statistical research to support the theory. More recently, such works as *Clash of Civilizations* by Huntington in 1996 have re-ignited the debate.

debate, the point that the United States and India have a similar style of democratic government is noteworthy and provides a powerful soft power bond.

5. The Role of Government

The Indian Independence Act of 1947 was intended to cut all legislative ties between the Indian Empire and the United Kingdom; however, how this was to be done was to shape the nature of conflict in the region for decades. The British wanted to hastily resolve the hostility between the Muslims and the Hindus so they could quicken their own departure. The plan the British crafted called for the partition of the Indian Empire into two states. The first state, India, was to fall under control of the Indian governor general (appointed by the Crown) and the INC. The second state, Pakistan, was to fall under the Pakistani governor general (also appointed by the Crown) and the ML. The military was to be divided based on geographical location, which gave India roughly two-thirds of the army and Pakistan just one third. Lastly, the Princely States broke all ties with Britain and the Indian Empire and were granted autonomy to choose whether to be added into India, Pakistan, or to remain independent, though many of them were rolled into India by the INC.⁷⁷

This set the stage for the ongoing Kashmir conflict. While most of the Princely States typically voted along religious lines, with Hindu populations electing to join India and Muslim populations with Pakistan, a few states decided not to join either. This was usually the case when the political leadership represented a minority of the population. Such was the case with the large Princely States of Kashmir (majority Muslim governed by Hindus), and Hyderabad (majority Hindu run by Muslims).⁷⁸ On October 22, 1947, armed tribal militias from Pakistan invaded Kashmir. These Muslim militias quickly crossed the border and were largely welcomed by the Muslim inhabitants. Kashmir state militias in border towns had their ramparts overrun and within days a handful of towns were now under the control of the Muslim militias. Fearful of these tribal militias,

⁷⁷ Edwardes, *The Last Years of British India*.

⁷⁸ Barnds, *India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers*, 38.

Kashmiri leadership reached out to India for military assistance. The answer from the INC was simple, join India and India will support Kashmir. On October 26, the leaders of Kashmir formally acceded into India and Kashmir was recognized as a state within the Indian nation.⁷⁹

Concerning soft power themes, from conversations this author has had with Indians educated on the matter, who wish to remain unnamed, since India's inception two strong held beliefs have shaped the course of its foreign and domestic policy. Both of which can be seen during the partition period and the conflict that followed. These beliefs are partly due to Indians' British ancestry, but largely due to the interactions with the ML and later Pakistan. The first is India's belief that a nation should not be formed along religious and/or ideological lines. This was one of the main arguments against the partition of India, which is one of the core disagreements that sparked the 1947 Kashmir crises and set the course for Indo-Pak relations. The second belief is that civilians must run the government and, particularly, the military. India then and now holds a very strong belief about keeping the military out of politics. Indian concern over this issue was later reinforced when Pakistan's government fell to a military coup in 1958 and again in 1977.

B. INDIAN CULTURE: INFLUENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES

While the legacy of British law, government, and language planted several soft power seeds, further analysis of another aspect of soft power—culture—uncovers indications that U.S. soft power is already taking hold. To make this point, this section briefly visits a historical example of the exportation of American culture as a method to capitalize on U.S. soft power in the Cold War. This section then explores the role of movies, both foreign and domestic, in Indian culture. The original purpose of this chapter was to explore any cultural similarities between the United States and India. As a result of research, however, it became apparent that not only are similarities present, but these similarities are largely the result of the exportation of American culture through the use of movies.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 40.

1. Soft Power and the Ability to Export Culture

U.S. soft power is unique to other nations' in its extraordinary ability to be exported. As stated by Josef Joffe, the publisher-editor of the German magazine *Die Zeit*, in Nye's *Soft Power*:

US culture, low-brow or high, radiates outward with an intensity last seen in the days of the Roman Empire—but with a novel twist. Rome's and Soviet Russia's cultural sway stopped exactly at their military borders. America's soft power, though, rules over an Empire on which the sun never sets.⁸⁰

This thesis is not arguing that that other nations do not export their own soft power—quite the opposite—but the quote is profoundly useful to describe the incredible reach and pervasiveness of U.S. soft power.⁸¹ For example, even though the Soviet Union pulled out of its alliance with the United States following World War II due to a lack of soft power bonds, as described in Chapter II, over time, the pervasiveness of U.S. soft power still found various ways through the Iron Curtain. This is evidenced by several works that discuss the influence of Western rock-n-roll music as a tool to agitate the youth under Soviet control.⁸²

This attraction to American rock music is on full display in Figure 7. In the picture, a German border guard sits atop the Berlin Wall carrying an umbrella sporting the logo of the American Music Television Channel (MTV)—a channel known for playing the music videos of American rock bands—shortly before the wall's destruction. The popularity of Western music was reinforced by the allure of it being forbidden within the Soviet Union. In Eastern Europe, where the Soviet regime was seen as an occupying force, this allure created an especially receptive audience. The antiestablishment music of

⁸⁰ Nye, *Soft Power*, 11.

⁸¹ Joseph Nye writes repeatedly about the export of soft power by nations other than the United States in his works. For specific examples, see Nye's *The Paradox of American Power*, 13, Table 1.1 and *Soft Power*, chapter 3, "Others' Soft Power."

⁸² Such works include: Timothy Ryback. *Rock around the Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 1954–1988* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1990); Leslie Woodhead, *How the Beatles Rocked the Kremlin: The Untold Story of a Noisy Revolution* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing: 2013).

the 1960s and 1970s played well into the resentment of many under Soviet control. As a result, when then Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev loosened the Soviet iron fist by enacting Perestroika and Glasnost, an agitated youth movement began to rise first in the Eastern Bloc and then all the way to Moscow.⁸³

Figure 7. MTV on the Berlin Wall



Source: “MTV’s Revolutionary Hour on the Berlin Wall,” *Guardian*, November 2, 2009, accessed September 2, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/media/2009/nov/02/mtv>.

While Western music on its own cannot on its own be given credit for the collapse of the Soviet Union, it certainly played a part and influenced the way people behind the Iron Curtain saw the world. In this subtle way, the exportation of American culture through film can similarly influence foreign cultures. Concerning American film in India, the result may not be as profound as the example above, but it still serves to introduce new ideas and help shape what ideals are important to a culture.

⁸³ Timothy Ryback. *Rock around the Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 1954–1988* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1990).

2. From Hollywood to Bollywood

America has been the industry leader in film since the early twentieth century.⁸⁴ This has made American movies the industry standard and has afforded these movies reach while also encouraging emulation. Even with increasing competition in foreign markets, American-made films have such an appeal that Hollywood movies consistently sell more tickets overseas than in the United States.⁸⁵ However, Josef Joffe, the German editor quoted earlier, was more critical in a later work with regard to the prospect of American movies serving as revenue for U.S. soft power. He writes, “Hundreds of millions of people around the world wear, listen, eat, drink, watch and dance American, but they do not identify these accouterments of their daily lives with America.”⁸⁶

To counter Joffe’s point, this thesis argues as American culture becomes familiar with the viewer (through movies), this familiarity breeds emulation. With emulation, as select ideas catch on and spread, comes “indigenization.”⁸⁷ That is, aspects of American culture implanted in the viewer slowly become absorbed and are no longer seen as strictly American. As this occurs, these aspects become part of the viewer’s culture as well. Once that aspect is embedded into a foreign culture, it becomes native and can no longer be separated or distinguished as “American.” The true power behind soft power is not that it is recognized as American, but rather that it creates common bonds that can serve to align socio-cultural norms. Joffe claims, the fact that these once-American influences are no longer seen as American, does not diminish these influences as a source of soft power, but actually serves to further this point.

In examining India, one sees that the Indians’ love of cinema can also be traced back to the British. In the 1930s, the British encouraged India to develop the Indian Cinematograph Enquiry Committee in an attempt to entice Indian viewers towards

⁸⁴ Robert Sklar, *Movie-Made America* (Toronto: Random House, 1975).

⁸⁵ “All Time Worldwide Box Office Grosses,” Box Office Mojo, accessed November 10, 2014, <http://boxofficemojo.com/alltime/world/>.

⁸⁶ Josef Joffe. “The Perils of Soft Power,” *The New York Times Magazine*, May 14, 2006.

⁸⁷ Mehta, and Pandharipande, *Bollywood and Globalization*, 126.

English movies over American movies. The result was that Indians developed a greater appreciation for film in general. As the Indians on the joint UK-India committee began to encourage the making of movies in India rather than relying on importation, the committee was disbanded by the British.⁸⁸ Following India's independence in 1947, this exposure to foreign film and the resulting desire to make movies would lead to an explosion within the Indian film industry. Not surprisingly, the golden age of Bollywood was from the 1950s through the 1960s. During this era, Indian movie plots were seemingly borrowed from films introduced to India during Hollywood's golden age during the 1920–40s. Evidence of emulation can be seen in Indian musicals, as the scenes of mass singing and dancing that has become iconic to Indian cinema actually has its roots in the American musicals during Hollywood's golden age before World War II.⁸⁹

An example of emulation turning toward indigenization is the 2004 movie *Bride and Prejudice*. This movie, directed by a famous Bollywood director and starring numerous Bollywood actors and actresses, had several scenes originally filmed in Hindi. The plot of this movie was a loose adaption of Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice* and featured a Hollywood actor, playing a character named William Darcy (Martin Henderson), who was falling in love with a Bollywood actress, playing Lalita Bakshi (Aishwarya Rai), who was balancing true love with traditional Indian concepts of marriage. What is remarkable is that the protagonist, Darcy, epitomizes the Western ideal of true love and individual choice. In contrast, the antagonist, Balraj Bingly, represents the traditional Indian caste culture of arranged marriages. Produced jointly by Miramax (U.S.) and Pathe Pictures (UK), it was translated into Hindi and released in the U.S., UK, and India near simultaneously and grossed nearly three times as much overseas (18 million U.S. dollars [USD] compared to U.S. domestic sales [6 million USD]).⁹⁰ The success of this film is not surprising as Indian culture has been recently battling with the influence of Western "true love" clashing with its traditional view on arranged marriages.

⁸⁸ Manju Jain, *Narratives of Indian Cinema* (Delhi: Ratna Sagar P. Ltd. 2009).

⁸⁹ Mehta, and Pandharipande, *Bollywood and Globalization*.

⁹⁰ The Numbers, "Bride & Prejudice (2005)," accessed November 10, 2014, <http://www.the-numbers.com/movie/Bride-and-Prejudice#tab=summary>.

This conflict has been reflected in many Indian films, with some movies for and some against, the true love ideal.⁹¹

It is also worth noting that not every cultural interaction leads to positive changes. This is seen in current Bollywood movies where homosexual jokes have made an unusual appearance. In one such movie, a Bollywood actor mistakenly kisses a man, which causes him to over-react by dramatically scrubbing out his mouth (mimicking a famous scene played by Jim Carey in the Hollywood movie, *Ace Ventura*). In traditional Indian culture, male-male physical interaction is seen as asexual, and it is common to see men holding hands. Inadvertently kissing a man would normally be accepted with ambivalence rather than a negative over-reaction, but as Indian viewers have become accustomed to American squeamishness about male-male physical interaction, they have adopted this foreign concept into their culture.⁹²

Another unintended result has been an increase in rapes in India. While rape was being committed by all sides during the troubled partition era, it is also seeing an unexpected increase recently.⁹³ This, in part, has been attributed to Indians adopting the American ideal of female beauty and the objectification of women as sexual objects, which, when imprinted on a society with a checkered past concerning rape, has had the unintended result of creating more violent crime.⁹⁴ Certainly, U.S. soft power cannot be blamed as the sole factor behind India's current rape dilemma, but it is arguably playing an amplifying role. While this example, along with the previous one, are not the best applications of U.S. soft power, it is evidence that exposure to foreign ideas can have a real impact. From speaking with Indian citizens, they are aware of the influence of American films, and those individuals resistant to foreign influences term this "cultural

⁹¹ Such popular films include: *Namaste London* (released in 2007), *Hyderabad Blues* (released in 1998), *Hyderabad Blues 2* (released in 2004), *Monsoon Wedding* (released in 2001), *Hum Dil De Chuke Sanam* (released in 1999).

⁹² Mehta, and Pandharipande, *Bollywood and Globalization*, 114–127.

⁹³ *Crime in India: 2012*, National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, accessed December 9, 2015, <http://ncrb.nic.in/CD-CII2012/Statistics2012.pdf>.

⁹⁴ Mehta, and Pandharipande, *Bollywood and Globalization*, 117–136.

invasion.” While this term is a bit more critical of these influences, the process of indigenization is the same.

Aside from its cultural impact, Hollywood has had an effect on the economy of both India and the United States. Movies portray images and phrases that resonate with viewers. For example, the Coca-Cola logo is one of the most widely recognized logos in the world regardless of the language of the nation, and it is common to see Coca-Cola signs on any given dusty road throughout the globe. This reach has led to the term “Coca-Colonization,”⁹⁵ referring to the product’s appeal and ability to be absorbed into local economies. In India, the influence of Hollywood has driven a rise in what Mehta calls “cultural merchandise,” these being foreign items that have been introduced through American film. An example of such merchandise is evident in the Indian greeting card industry. This is because new holidays, such as Valentine’s Day, and the tradition of sending cards to celebrate these holidays have been attributed to Hollywood.⁹⁶ Even more than greeting cards, Hollywood has helped make India a market for American goods. Following the end of the Cold War and once India no longer had to remain non-aligned, American goods that were previously only seen on screen were now available in stores and proved to be in high demand.⁹⁷

Box office sales also create massive amounts of revenue. According to a 2014 theatrical statistics summary published by the Motion Picture Association of America, even though India has a robust film industry of its own, it ranked fifth in international box office markets, totaling \$1.7 billion USD in 2014.⁹⁸ This would suggest that India is a very receptive market for American film, and correspondingly, receptive to those ideals that are being seen on screen. However, when considering the other powers in the Next Great Game and the receptiveness of the audience described earlier, of the top 20

⁹⁵ George A. McKay, “Consumption, Coca-colonisation, Cultural Resistance—and Santa Claus,” in *Christmas, Ideology and Popular Culture*, ed. Jean Wilson (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).

⁹⁶ Mehta, and Pandharipande, *Bollywood and Globalization*, 5.

⁹⁷ Bertsch, Gahlaut, and Srivastava, *Engaging India*.

⁹⁸ “Theatrical Market Statistics 2014,” Motion Picture Association of America, March 2015, accessed October 1, 2015, <http://www.mpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/MPAA-theatrical-Market-Statistics-2014>.

international box office markets, seven lie within Asia and eight are within Western nations. The only region to see a decrease from 2013 to 2014 was the Middle East and Africa. While it may be true that ticket sales are not necessarily indicative of any substantive alignment of geopolitical interests with the United States, given the information previously discussed about the importance of perception, combined with the indicators that help identify where U.S. soft power is proving effective, then movies (and movies in India) warrant more consideration. This makes American film a substantial soft power factor in south Asia and beyond.

C. U.S. AND INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY: COMMON THEMES

While the realm of national foreign policy decisions is typically seen as dominated by hard power calculations, soft power can play a very nuanced, yet powerful role. One of the greatest outcomes that can be cultivated from U.S. soft power reserves, as Nye explains, is the ability to set the global agenda.⁹⁹ Setting the agenda refers to shaping what is acceptable in geopolitics, typically done through the construct of international organizations. For instance, if the United States supports an organization that claims a certain act or aspiration is unreasonable, based upon the idea that the act is harmful to the greater international community, and that organization is seen as legitimate by the international community, then a nation seeking said aspiration is deterred from attempting it. An example of this would be the recent 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference. As part of the conference, states deliberated about voluntarily making choices that may not be in their individual best interests (such as incurring additional production costs, or funding other nations to assist in their additional production costs in order to limit “harmful” emissions) but did so in under the banner that these decisions are for the greater good of the international community.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Joseph Nye, “Wielding Soft Power,” in *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 99–126.

¹⁰⁰ Fiona Harvey, and Kim Willsher, “Paris Climate Summit: World Leaders Told to Iron out Difference before Talks end,” *The Guardian*, November 28, 2015, accessed December 9, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/nov/28/paris-climate-summit-world-leaders-talks-france>.

The attraction to participate in organizations that aspire to the greater good can come from many sources and can be compared to the concept of “soft power bandwagoning” discussed earlier. For instance, in the case of the Climate Change Conference, based upon the opinions given from individual Indians this author spoke with, they see the conference as a ploy by industrialized nations seeking to place limits on developing nations, such as India. Those viewpoints notwithstanding, India still saw the benefit of attending the conference—and possibly aligning with the other attending nations—and sent delegates to actively participate.¹⁰¹ The point on this observation is not to make comment on the validity of concerns raised in conference, but rather to emphasize that such organizations rely heavily on their perception in order to be recognized as a valid international powerbroker. Suffice it to say that utilizing soft power in such a role is a very difficult process and requires strong like-minded states to be meaningful.

A brief review of the shared U.S. and Indian domestic values discussed previously in this chapter provides additional avenues to cultivate other soft power bonds when considering foreign policy. Such previously discussed values as the type of government and the role of government could prove useful to unite over the ideas of spreading democracy or to hedge against hostile theocracies or military dictatorships. However, as this next section addresses, while U.S.-Indo relations have been historically weak and at times at odds, further analysis of Indian foreign policy reveal several more common themes that show promise for future cooperation. Two illustrative examples are reviewed next.

1. The Fight against Sponsored Terrorism

By the mid-1990s, Pakistan was dangerously close to having a deployable nuclear arsenal. So close in fact that India had to believe that Pakistan was already nuclear armed, although the first successful test of a Pakistani nuclear device would not occur until 1998. This created a dilemma for Pakistan, where if it was seen as nuclear armed, whether or

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

not it was true, it would be treated as nuclear armed. This meant that an Indian first strike was a real possibility. Fearing nuclear war, Pakistan developed a new way to fight India. In the 1990s, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) began to conduct operations against India. The group's goal was to create an insurgency in the Kashmir region of India, and in 1995, Pakistan was heavily sponsoring LeT fighters with funding, intelligence, and a safe haven within its borders.¹⁰²

The use of the LeT as a state sponsored non-state actor (NSA) provided a “reliable proxy” for Pakistan.¹⁰³ These NSAs were adapted to serve the same objective as the former Cold War proxy forces (such as those used against the United States in Vietnam and against the Soviets in Afghanistan). For India, this created a dilemma as it knew the LeT was sponsored by Pakistan—though Pakistan denied involvement—but India could not strike the Pakistani homeland for fear of a nuclear retaliation.¹⁰⁴ Instead, India was dragged into several years of costly counter-insurgency operations against the LeT in the Indian state of Kashmir.

From discussions with senior Indian military members, the Indian military described the Kashmir campaign as a fight for “hearts and minds,” a very similar terminology used to describe U.S. counter-insurgency tactics in Iraq from 2004–2007. From discussions with other Indian officials, this experience in Kashmir helped to shape Indian public opinion strongly against the use of NSAs and specifically religious oriented NSAs. More than just a hard power concern, both the United States and India hold strong beliefs about freedom of religion, and these are reinforced by a shared concern over radical religious terror groups, which could provide a soft power avenue for the United States and India to join over.

¹⁰² Stephen Tankel, *Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects* (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, 2011).

¹⁰³ Ibid., 1.

¹⁰⁴ Dinshaw Mistry, “Complexity of Deterrence among New Nuclear States,” in *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age*, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 185–187.

2. The Use and Spread of Nuclear Weapons

The ongoing conflict in Kashmir between India and Pakistan was drastically escalated when Pakistan, retaliating to Indian nuclear tests, was emboldened by the successful test of a nuclear weapon of its own in 1998. Pakistan subsequently invaded the Kashmir region with nearly 1,000 conventional military soldiers in 1999, in what became known as the Kargil War. With tensions at an all-time high and fears of a nuclear war imminent, the United Nations was unable to form a cohesive strategy and the United States felt compelled to intervene.¹⁰⁵

U.S. intervention might have been the intended outcome of this conflict all along. Considering that the balance of power in the region remained unsettled after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and that both Pakistan and India were vying for U.S. support against the other. Pakistan was relying on traditional U.S. support for its claims in Kashmir, while India was slowly mending ties with the United States following the end of the Cold War. Pakistan was fearful of a growing U.S.-Indo relationship, and “many senior Pakistani military officials believe[d] that these same (nuclear) capabilities ... served to catalyze US diplomatic interest.”¹⁰⁶ In this way, the awesome destructive power of a nuclear device served not only as a military weapon, but also as an effective weapon to leverage international attention.

This nuclear standoff was deeply unsettling for Indian policy makers. Since then, India has re-evaluated the way they think about nuclear weapons, both foreign and domestically controlled. According to conversations with senior level officers at the Naval War College in Goa, India, India is currently grappling with several nuclear concerns. The first is nuclear proliferation, specifically through a NSA. The second concern is the use of a nuclear weapon as a first strike option (against them as India has a stated “no first use” policy). The third is the use of tactical level nuclear weapons. While

¹⁰⁵ Mistry, *Complexity of Deterrence*, 185—186.

¹⁰⁶ Ashley Tellis, and Christine Fair quoted in Mistry, “Complexity of Deterrence among New Nuclear States,” 190.

these Indian concerns are directed toward Pakistan, and to some extent China, the United States shares these concerns almost universally.

These Indian concerns are part of a larger and very complex topic that this thesis encourages future research to study. The history between the United States and India/Pakistan over their respective nuclear programs has been a point of contention on all sides and is a topic that is beyond the scope of this thesis. Though this is a difficult and contested issue, these concerns highlight what India thinks the role of a nuclear weapon should be. These ideas are largely shared by the United States and could be leveraged by an international organization to stabilize relations regarding this issue in south Asia and beyond. This must be kept in mind as recent developments give promise for increased Indian cooperation with the international community in the future, such as: in 2008, when India lobbied for and attained a trade waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group to conduct trade though India is not signee of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) and in 2009, when India agreed to destroy its stockpile of offensive chemical weapons.¹⁰⁷ These two instances show India's knowledge and acceptance of some form of international community's normative structure.

Throughout this chapter, several common soft power bonds have been discussed and have been suggested as avenues to cultivate U.S. soft power reserves. However, as is addressed in the following chapter, even when an avenue presents itself, soft power may show varying degrees of success, depending on the application. This is because it is important to understand that U.S. soft power must be adaptive, both to the type of relationship being constructed and to the social-cultural norms of the partnered nation.

¹⁰⁷ "India," Nuclear Threat Initiative, accessed December 9, 2015, <http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/india/nuclear/>.

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IV. FINAL THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT U.S. SOFT POWER

One of the side effects of the recent growth of Indian national power and influence is a sense that a relationship with the United States no longer needs to be confined to the framework of an existing U.S.-Pak relationship. That is, if engagements are done correctly and with respect to the proper application of hard power and/or soft power. From speaking with researchers within the Indian think-tank Observer Research Foundation (ORF) in New Delhi, India (all of whom agreed to speak on a condition of anonymity), India once had a zero-sum mentality, which persisted through much of the 1950s and 1970s. However, that view is no longer as stringent, as many Indians believe that their relative strength to Pakistan, along with the warming of relations with the United States recently, have allowed the United States to engage both India and Pakistan simultaneously. However, these engagements must be done in proper balance with relation to the use of hard power and soft power. Consider that while Pakistan is a vital U.S. ally in the region, their relationship is predicated on hard power concerns. Concerning India, the United States has much more soft power reserves that can be cultivated to form a closer relationship without necessarily upsetting current partnerships or initiating a security competition as discussed earlier. This shift is already occurring, as evidenced by the quote from *World Affairs*:

With India's economic rise, fears of Chinese hegemony, and the unraveling relationship with Pakistan, the US is now pursuing what previously would have been regarded as an asymmetrical foreign policy agenda in South Asia. As part of its new Asia-Pacific strategy, the US is committed to strengthening India in all major sectors of national development, with the hope of making it a global power and a bulwark against Chinese influence in Asia. Meanwhile, Washington is looking for a minimalist relationship with Pakistan, focused almost exclusively on security concerns.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ Shehzad Qazi, "Hedging Bets: Washington's Pivot to India," *World Affairs* (November–December 2012), accessed October 1, 2015, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/hedging-bets-washington%E2%80%99s-pivot-india>.

While soft power has helped to form the foundation for a deeper relationship with India, it is not a universal answer to every U.S. foreign engagement. For the United States, each partnership must be evaluated based on the desired outcomes and also by what type of relationship is feasible. At times, relationships may present themselves as advantageous to the United States as related to a specific hard power objective, and when that partner is not receptive to U.S. soft power, the improper implementation of U.S. soft power will show negative results. To better explore this concept, the following section will explore the repercussions of not understanding the role of soft power in foreign relations.

A. U.S. SOFT POWER AND PAKISTAN

As was briefly discussed in the opening chapter, the United States and Pakistan have had long ties; however, these ties are less about any long-term shared strategic objectives and more about a string of U.S. short-term hard power objectives. For example, U.S. relations with Pakistan were strained following the Kargil War and subsequent military coup that saw General Pervez Musharraf overthrow elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on October 12, 1999. However, while the United States objected to a military coup overtaking a democracy, the events of September 11, 2001 altered the nature of U.S.-Pak relations for years to come. Just as the United States needed Pakistan as a launch pad to conduct a proxy fight in Afghanistan against the Soviets in 1980s, the United States would again turn to Pakistan to facilitate logistical support for a fight against the Taliban in the 2000s.

Whether cooperation with Pakistan was necessary is not a point of discussion this thesis wishes to raise, but it is important to acknowledge that this cooperation had an effect on U.S. initiatives towards India as once again Pakistan was seen as the principle U.S. partner in south Asia. The main point to be derived from this section is that the United States' invasion into Afghanistan was a hard power consideration that overlooked many socio-cultural and geopolitical differences between the United States and Pakistan, much like the alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II. Butt and Schhofield explain:

Aspects such as the nuclear proliferation network of A.Q. Khan, the informal and alleged contacts between Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and its close strategic relationship with China, might suggest that Pakistan regularly falls into what is often viewed as an enemy camp. But it is still perceived as a key western ally; in a sense, it is absolved of responsibility for these actions.¹⁰⁹

This paradox was highlighted when President Bush formalized Pakistan as a major non-NATO (MNNA) ally in 2004 while at the same time Pakistan was objecting to numerous U.S. led strikes conducted in Pakistan targeting the leaders of Al-Qaeda. The benefit of Pakistan's cooperation with the United States was increased military and economic assistance, as well as a shared desire to replace the Taliban with a more Pak-friendly Afghan government.¹¹⁰ However, the cost for cooperating with the United States came at a price for Pakistani leaders since this decision seemed to stand at odds with Pakistani core beliefs. As described earlier, the core beliefs of a nation are vital to understanding what common bonds exist to cultivate U.S. soft power. Since this decision placed two partners together with differing ideals, it created internal friction, especially within Pakistan. This internal friction was seen as furious debates within Pakistani government circles erupted against Pakistan's cooperation in a U.S.-led war. Many Pakistani senior cabinet officials, including the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief General Mahmud Ahmed, were vehemently against supporting the United States in a war against the Taliban.¹¹¹ This not only led to significant changes within the Musharraf regime but continues to be a source of domestic unrest today.

This friction makes Pakistan a reluctant U.S. partner, and is what has and will limit the U.S.-Pak alliance to a string of short-term partnerships formed along temporarily coinciding hard power interests. The friction exists because Pakistan is largely un-receptive to U.S. soft power, which makes it difficult to form a meaningful soft power foundation between the two nations. The reason why Pakistan appears un-receptive is due

¹⁰⁹ Usama Butt, and Julian Schhofield, *Pakistan: The U.S., Geopolitics and Grand Strategies* (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 1–2.

¹¹⁰ Butt, and Schhofield, *Pakistan: The U.S., Geopolitics and Grand Strategies*, 5.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

in great part to a generally unfavorable view of the United States, a view that is reinforced by Pakistan's relationship with a vocal and unabashed anti-American state: Iran.¹¹²

Iran and Pakistan have had strong ties since Pakistani independence in 1947. Iran was the first nation to formally recognize Pakistan as a sovereign state, and it provided Pakistan with aid during its fight with India over Kashmir. This is not surprising since the United States supported both the Shah of Iran and Pakistani claims over Kashmir at around the same time. However, when the Shah fell and Iran turned adversarial towards the United States, Pakistani ties to Iran actually increased. In 1979, Pakistan was the first nation to recognize the new regime in Tehran and even gave military aid to Iran during the Iraq-Iran war in 1980, diverting some U.S. arms intended for the Afghan mujahedeen to Iran, even though Iranian sentiment towards the United States had been made clear.¹¹³ Recently, Pakistan and Iran have been increasing their trade in both value and quantity to their highest levels to date. This was made possible by a preferential trade agreement signed in 2004.¹¹⁴ Increased cooperation is currently under consideration through a proposed free trade agreement between the two nations. Pakistani Ambassador to Iran, Noor Mohammad Jadmani, endorsed the act by emphasizing that Pakistan and Iran share many significant soft power bonds by saying, "Religious and cultural commonalities are the cause of broadening mutual cooperation with Iran."¹¹⁵

Further evidence that Pakistan is leaning toward Tehran and away from Washington is evidenced in a 2012 Pew Research poll wherein Pakistani respondents reported a 79 percent approval rating of Iran. The next highest approval rating for Iran

¹¹² For reference, see Figure 1. ("Global Views of the United States") on page 4 of this thesis. In the figure, Pakistan exhibits a 62 percent unfavorable view compared to a 22 percent favorable view of the United States.

¹¹³ Mehtab Ali Shah, *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethical Impacts on Diplomacy, 1974–1994* (I. B. Tauris: London: 1997), 30.

¹¹⁴ *Preferential Trade Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran*, accessed June, 17 2015, http://www.commerce.gov.pk/PIPTA/Pak-Iran_Preferential_Trade_Agreement.pdf.

¹¹⁵ "Pakistan Offers Iran to Sign Free Trade Agreement," *Tehran Times*, April 29, 2015, accessed June 17, 2015, http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=246412.

came from Lebanon at just 39 percent.¹¹⁶ In a similar poll conducted in 2014, the United States gained only a 14 percent approval rating from Pakistani respondents, which was actually up from a mere 11 percent in 2013.¹¹⁷ This slight increase may be attributed to U.S.-led relief efforts in Pakistan following a flood in the Punjab region in September 2014. This small bump is promising for the United States, but it is likely to decline over time without further aid to keep it afloat. These poor numbers would indicate that, as of now, Pakistan is not receptive. Therefore, if the audience is not receptive, U.S. soft power cannot exist. Without the ties that soft power creates, the U.S.-Pak partnership will always be based solely on hard power calculations, and any attempt to cultivate U.S. soft power prematurely will result in friction. That is not to say that soft power is not important in a hard-power, centric relationship. As was seen in the previously described case of the fall of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, soft power can still play a very important role in an unreceptive audience; it just may take time to prove fruitful.

A hard-power, centric partnership is not necessarily an absolute negative, as a U.S.-Pak relationship based on hard power has and can be useful to further U.S. strategic objectives. What it does mean is that a U.S.-Pak relationship must be evaluated through a strict hard-power, centric approach with specific and defined hard power objectives. Since the relationship will lack a substantive soft power foundation, once the hard power objective is achieved, it is difficult to know whether the partnership will last, much like the World War II alliance between the U.S. and the USSR as previously discussed.

B. INDIAN SOFT POWER AND AFGHANISTAN

Shortly after the United States extended a MNNA alliance to Pakistan, it attempted to court India with a proposed MNNA working partnership designation; however, this was quickly rejected. The fact that the MNNA working partnership designation was declined by India is telling, especially since India had become

¹¹⁶ Max Fisher, "Iran is Popular in Pakistan, Overwhelmingly Disliked Everywhere Else," *The Washington Post*, January 11, 2013, accessed June 16, 2015, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/01/11/iran-is-popular-in-pakistan-overwhelmingly-disliked-everywhere-else/>.

¹¹⁷ "A Less Gloomy Mood in Pakistan," Pew Global, August 27, 2014, accessed June 16, 2015, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/08/27/a-less-gloomy-mood-in-pakistan/>.

increasingly engaged in Afghanistan around this time also. The U.S. invasion into Afghanistan could have provided India an opportunity to influence outside its immediate borders and punctuate its role as a regional powerbroker.¹¹⁸ India's strategy in Afghanistan focused on: preventing Anti-India terrorism, deterring Pakistani and Taliban influences on Afghanistan politics, and projecting India's regional dominance into Central Asia.¹¹⁹ India's objectives with Afghanistan were largely compatible with those of the United States and could have been used to further U.S. strategic interests.

At the time of the U.S.-led invasion, India had close ties with Afghanistan, arguably closer than Pakistan did with Afghanistan.¹²⁰ However, this relationship was based on a soft power foundation, and therefore by suggesting a hard power partnership with the United States, the United States was misunderstanding the balance of the forms of national power at work. The Afghan-Indo relationship was based on shared cultural bonds between Afghanistan and south Asia, a relationship that flourished once the conflict of the Durand Line was passed from the Indian Empire to Pakistan.¹²¹ These soft power bonds were seen in 2001 when the Indian foreign minister traveled to meet the Afghan interim government. Instead of arms or food, the Indian representative traveled in a plane packed with Bollywood movies that were quickly distributed throughout Kabul.¹²² The successful spread of Indian soft power by way of Bollywood, which has been shown to share several similarities with Hollywood, demonstrates the receptiveness of Afghanistan towards Indian soft power. This could have been used to the United States' benefit, if the United States had better understood the nature of the relationships.

¹¹⁸ Harsh V. Pant, *India's Changing Afghanistan Policy: Regional and Global Implications* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012), 2.

¹¹⁹ Larry Hanauer, and Peter Chalk, *India's and Pakistan's Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), 11–13.

¹²⁰ Pant, *India's Changing Afghanistan Policy*, 2–4.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹²² Nye, *Soft Power*, 10.

C. INDIA AND CHINA

The rise of China has created a unique opportunity for the United States with relation to a partnership with India. As has been discussed, while U.S. soft power has found fertile ground in India, U.S. foreign policy has historically driven a wedge between the two nations. Though, with Indian concern over the rise of China, this checkered history is willing to be overlooked by the Indians to further a closer Indo-U.S. relationship. From conversations this author has had with Indians on the matter, it appears that just as the Indians were more fearful of the Japanese and supported Britain during World War II, currently Indians are more apprehensive about Chinese intentions and are more likely to support the United States in the Next Great Game.¹²³ As addressed in S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly's work, *The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations: An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future*:

The United States and India are enjoying increasingly close relations. This represents a transformation of the two countries' past relationship, which was characterized by suspicion and distrust. This change ... has resulted from a convergence of structural, domestic, and individual leadership factors.¹²⁴

Many of these "factors" (as Kapur writes) are similar to Nye's attributes of soft power. Therefore, the hard power development created by shared concerns over the rise of China does not deter from the importance of soft power; in fact, it reinforces it. It creates the opportunity to integrate all the tools of U.S. national power, or as Nye calls it, smart power.

This development can be looked at as similar to the events that formed the Anglo-American "special" partnership. The Anglo-American relationship started in conflict, but that relationship solidified over the shared hard power objective to defeat Nazi Germany. However, as the Soviet Union broke away from the greater alliance, the Anglo-American alliance remained intact due to a strong soft power foundation. This foundation allowed

¹²³ For reference on India's participation in World War II see: Peter Fay, *The Forgotten Army: India's Armed Struggle for Independence, 1942-1945* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993); Compton MacKenzie, *Eastern Epic*, Vol. 1 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1951).

¹²⁴ Kapur, and Ganguly, "The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations," 642.

the partnership to be adapted to address various hard power situations over time. This special partnership became the cornerstone of NATO and remains in-tact today, outlasting the rise and fall of the Soviet Union. Similarly, the U.S.-Indo relation was started in conflict (though admittedly not in direct armed conflict like the Anglo-American relationship but conflict nonetheless); however, now the U.S.-Indo relationship can be formalized over a shared concern over the rise of China. What will make the U.S.-Indo relationship special are all the aforementioned soft power bonds, much like the Anglo-American alliance, that can serve to keep the U.S.-Indo partnership adaptive and applicable long after the rise and fall of China.

D. CONCLUSION

By reviewing the evidence presented thus far, it is clear that the United States and India share several soft power bonds as a result of their respective historic connections to British colonialism. This may also be the reason why American movies are having such an impact on Indian culture. Through the influence of Hollywood, and subsequently Bollywood, and the indigenization process, American films have taken root in India, which has increased attraction, improved U.S. perception, and created a receptive audience. In turn, this increases U.S. soft power reserves. Next, this thesis has uncovered several instances where soft power was either misunderstood or used incorrectly and explained why the type relationship is invariably tied to the form of U.S. national power that must be exercised. Though at times other U.S. relationships within the region may present themselves as advantageous for short-term, hard power gains, ultimately the United States must be cognizant of the type of relationship that is presenting itself and understand that the tools of government are less important than the form of power being exercised. Finally, this thesis explored the role that a rising China may play in catalyzing an Indo-American partnership, using soft power as its foundation, and integrating all the tools of national power to form smart power. Considering all the evidence presented thus far, in conclusion, it cannot be emphasized enough that India should be further explored as a potential partner in the Next Great Game.

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